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Recent Developments 
Buchanan v. Angelone: 
In Buchanan v. Angelone, 118 S.Ct. 757 (1998), the 
United States Supreme Court 
held that the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution are 
not violated when jury 
instructions fail to address the 
concepts of mitigating evidence 
and particular statutorily defined 
mitigating factors presented in 
capital sentencing hearings. 
Therefore, in this case the 
Supreme Court maintained that 
Eighth Amendment 
requirements of individualized 
sentencing in capital cases are 
satisfied when the jury is 
allowed to consider all relevant 
evidence. 
Doug las McArthur 
Buchanan, Jr. ("Buchanan") 
murdered his father, 
stepmother, and younger 
brothers on September 15, 
1987. After the conviction for 
the capital murders and 
subsequent death sentencing, 
Buchanan sought a writ of 
habeas corpus claiming that the 
jury that imposed his sentence 
was improperly instructed with 
regard to mitigating evidence. 
In the Circuit Court of 
Amherst County, Virginia, 
Buchanan was convicted by a 
jury under the Virginia statute for 
the "capital murder of more than 
one person as part of the same 
act or transaction." Buchanan 
was subsequently sentenced to 
death by the jury which was 
imposed by the court through a 
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statutorily mandated sentenCing 
hearing. The conviction and 
death sentence were affirmed 
by the Virginia Supreme Court 
on direct appeal and upon 
review for proportionality. 
Buchanan's request for federal 
habeas relief was denied by the 
United States District Court for 
the Westem District of Virginia. 
The Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit held that by 
allowing the jury to consider all 
relevant mitigating evidence, 
Virginia's sentenCing procedure 
satisfied the Eighth Amendment 
requirement of individualized 
sentenCing in capital cases. 
The Supreme Court of the 
United States granted certiorari 
and affirmed. 
Preliminarily, the Court 
analyzed the two different 
aspects of the capital 
sentenCing process: the 
eligibility phase and the 
selection phase. Buchanan, 
118 U. S. at 761. The Court 
defined the eligibility phase as 
the phase in which "the jury 
narrows the class of defendants 
eligible for the death penalty." 
Id. (citing Tuilaepa v. California, 
512 U.S. 967,971 (1994». The 
selection phase was defined as 
the phase in which "the jury 
determines whether to impose a 
death sentence on an eligible 
defendant." Id. (citing Tuilaepa, 
512 U.S. at 972). By 
distinguishing between the two 
phases the Court was able to 
define the differing constitutional 
treatment applied to each 
phase. In the case at bar, the 
Court found the selection phase 
to be applicable because it 
"emphasized the need for a 
broad inquiry into all relevant 
mitigating evidence to allow an 
individualized determination." 
Id. (citing Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 
971-73). As a result, the Court 
found that the defendant 
wrongly argued that discretion to 
make an individualized 
determination and have that 
discretion limited and channeled 
during the selection phase must 
both be afforded to the jury. Id. 
A more appropriate argument 
would have been to assert that 
only the aspect of discretion to 
make an individualized 
determination is to be afforded 
during the selection phase. 
The Court expressed the 
concem that during the selection 
phase a jury may be precluded 
by restrictions on its sentenCing 
determination. Id. Such 
preclusion would not allow the 
jury to give effect to mitigating 
evidence. Id. Based on this 
concem the Court looked to the 
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applicable standard outlined in 
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 
370 (1990). Id. In Boyde, the 
Court held the standard to be 
"'whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury has 
applied the challenged 
instruction in a way that 
prevents the consideration of 
constitutionally relevant 
evidence.'" Id. (quoting Boyde, 
494 U.S. at 380). The Court 
further stated that its prior 
"decisions suggest that 
complete jury discretion is 
constitutionally permissible." Id. 
at 761-62. 
By looking at "the entire 
context in which the instructions 
were given," the Court found 
that the instructions expressly 
informed reasonable jurors to 
consider mitigating evidence. 
Id. at 762. The Court further 
reasoned that a reasonable juror 
would not disregard four days of 
defense testimony on 
Buchanan's background and 
character and another two days 
of testimony regarding his family 
background and mental and 
emotional problems given the 
instruction to consider "all the 
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evidence." Id. After analysis of 
the express language and the 
context of the challenged jury 
instructions, the Court found 
that the jury was not precluded 
from giving effect to the 
mitigating evidence. Id. at 763. 
In a dissenting opinion, 
Justice Breyer, joined by 
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, 
asserted that the majority 
misapplied the standard of 
"'whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury has 
applied the challenged 
instruction in a way that 
prevents the consideration of 
constitutionally relevant 
evidence.'" Id. (Breyer, J., 
dissenting)(quoting Boyde, 494 
U.S. at 380). The dissent 
looked to the natural reading of 
the language in the state pattern 
jury instructions and their 
context. Id. at 765. It was 
determined that attorneys who 
do not generally represent 
capital defendants and jurors 
who are not attorneys will not 
have the same natural reading 
of the instructions. Id. As a 
result, the dissenters alleged 
that "taking the instructions and 
the context together, the judge's 
instructions created a 
'reasonable likelihood' that the 
jury 'applied the challenged 
instruction in a way that 
prevents the consideration of 
constitutionally relevant 
evidence.'" Id. at 766 (citing 
Boyde, 494 U.S.at 380). 
With its decision in 
Buchanan v. Angelone, the 
United States Supreme Court 
adopted the Fourth Circuit's 
view that the Eighth 
Amendment requirement of 
individualized sentencing in 
capital cases is satisfied when 
the jury is allowed to consider all 
relevant mitigating evidence. In 
light of the finality of an imposed 
death sentence, the greatest 
care should be taken to ensure 
that each defendant's 
constitutional rights are strictly 
enforced. Where there is 
potential for misinterpretation 
resulting in a death sentence, 
the most critical and 
conservative analysis should be 
performed since the opportunity 
to appeal is lost upon execution. 
